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ABSTRACT
The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity investments differ dramatically
across  institutions.    Using  detailed  and  hitherto  unexplored  records  of  fund  investors  and
performance, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of different classes of limited
partners.  In particular, endowments’ annual returns are nearly 14% greater than average.  Funds
selected by investment advisors and banks lag sharply.  These results are robust to controlling for
the type and year of the investment, as well as to the use of different specifications.  Analyses of
reinvestment  decisions  and  young  funds  suggest  that  the  results  are  not  primarily  due  to
endowments’ greater access to established funds.  Finally, we examine the differences in the choice
of intermediaries across various institutional investors and their relationship to success.  We find that
LPs that have higher average IRRs also tend to invest in older funds and have a smaller fraction of
GPs in their geographic area, and that the performance of university endowments is correlated with
measures of the quality and loyalty of the student body.
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Over the past three decades, institutional investors have controlled an increasing 
share of the U.S. equity markets: Gompers and Metrick (2001) calculate that their share 
of  U.S.  public  equity  markets  exceeded  the  50%  threshold  in  1995.
1    There  is  a 
significant and  growing literature in financial economics that seeks to understand the 
investment decisions of institutional investors and the differences between the various 
classes of investors.  Gompers and Metrick (2001) document that institutional investors 
prefer stocks that have greater market capitalizations, are more liquid, and with higher 
book-to-market ratios and lower returns in the prior year.
2  This literature thus far has 
been focused on the differences between institutional and individual investors. 
 
One question that has attracted much less scrutiny, however, is the heterogeneity 
in  investment  strategies  and  sophistication  across  different  types  of  institutional 
investors.  (Table 2 of Gompers and Metrick (2001) is a rare exception.) This neglect is 
surprising  because  of  the  large  differences  in  organizational  structure,  investment 
objectives,  or  even  the  perceived  level  of  sophistication  across  various  institutions.  
Moreover, recent theoretical literature highlights the extent to which differences in the 
sophistication about financial markets as well as agency problems between the ultimate 
                                                 
1Their calculation only examines institutions with greater than $100 million of securities 
under  discretionary  management  that  are  required  to  file  a  13F  form  with  the  U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and thus excludes hedge and private equity funds 
and those with less than $100 million in assets.  Thus, their estimate is a lower bound on 
institutional holdings. 
 
2Other studies have suggested that institutional investors are less likely to buy stocks on 
days  with  high  trading  volume  (Barber  and  Odean  (2003))  or  to  herd  into  particular 
stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1995))  and  that  their  investments  fall  into  a  few  well-defined  styles  (Froot  and  Teo 
(2004)).   2 
investors  and  financial  institutions  can  have  profound  implications  for  investment 
decisions, portfolio allocations, and ultimately investment returns.
3  
 
Moreover,  many  institutions  do  not  invest  all—or  even  most—of  their  funds 
directly,  but  rather  do  so  through  intermediaries.    While  there  has  been  a  growth  of 
research  into  investment  style  of  intermediaries  in  recent  years,
4  the  choices  that 
institutions make when selecting intermediaries, what we may term "intermediary style," 
are poorly understood. 
 
This paper looks at a specific class of investment decisions made by institutions: 
their investments in private equity funds.  We analyze investment styles and performance 
across several different classes of investors, known as limited partners (LPs).  We begin 
with the identification of a puzzle: different classes of investors in private equity have 
enjoyed  dramatically  different  returns  over  the  past  two  decades.    Using  detailed 
records—hitherto  unexplored  by  academics—of  the  composition  and  performance  of 
funds that are selected by different classes of investors, we document very substantial 
differences across the returns that investors enjoy.  On average, endowments’ average 
                                                 
3For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that information asymmetries between 
investors  and  intermediaries  create  limits  to  arbitrage  that  can  affect  the  portfolio 
strategies and eventually the returns of the latter.  (Similarly, see Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002).)  Because  the  extent  of  agency  problems  may  differ  dramatically  across 
institutions, considerable differences in the behavior of institutional investors could be 
expected. 
 
4For  example,  Barberis  and  Shleifer  (2003)  theoretically  discuss  investors’  choices 
between value and growth stocks and their implications.   3 
annual returns from private equity funds are nearly 14% greater than the average investor.  
Funds selected by investment advisors and banks lag sharply.   
 
Next we explore the importance of LPs’ reinvestment strategies in explaining the 
differences in LP performance.  This is the central means by which LPs can adjust their 
portfolio and exert governance pressure on the fund, since private equity is a very illiquid 
industry where investors have little recourse to their investment once the capital has been 
committed.  We find that endowments and public pension funds generally are much less 
likely to reinvest in a given partnership than all other LP classes.  Moreover, these two 
classes of LPs are better at forecasting the performance of follow-on funds.  Follow-on 
funds  in  which  endowments  (and  to  a  lesser  extent,  public  pension  funds)  decide  to 
reinvest  show  much  higher  performance  than  those  funds  where  they  decided  not  to 
reinvest.  Other LP classes do not display these performance patterns.  Corporate pension 
funds and advisors are more likely to reinvest if the current fund had high performance, 
but this often does not translate into higher future performance.  These findings suggest 
that endowments proactively use the information they gain as inside investors to improve 
their  investment  decisions,  while  other  LPs  seem  less  willing  or  able  to  use  this 
information.   
 
A natural concern is whether these substantial performance differences between 
LP classes could be driven by other factors than variations in ability or sophistication.  
First, we want to assess whether these differences are driven by differences in the time 
periods in which the investments were made and other observable characteristics.  Earlier   4 
studies  have  shown  that  the  private  equity  industry  is  subject  to  large  cyclicality  in 
returns. (See, for example, Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2001) and Kaplan and Schoar 
(2004).)  Moreover, many endowments began investing in private equity funds before 
other investors.  Even after controlling for fund type and the vintage year in which the 
investment was made, we continue to see superior annual performance of between 9 and 
12 percent by endowments.  The results are robust to examining patterns at the fund, 
rather  than  the  investment,  level:  performance  is  positively  related  to  the  number  of 
endowments  investing  in  the  fund,  but  negatively  related  to  the  number  of  banks 
investing.  We also find that within the different groups, older LPs tend to have better 
performance  than  LPs  that  enter  the  industry  at  a  later  time.    These  differences  are 
particularly significant for corporate pension funds, advisors, and insurance companies.  
We suggest that this may  at least partially due to the fact that  younger  LPs  are less 
experienced in private equity investing and also might have inferior access to established 
and successful funds.   
 
A second important concern is whether these variations in performance could be 
due to systematic differences in the risk profiles of the funds that different classes of LPs 
choose.  For example, endowments could be systematically investing in riskier funds and 
therefore  have  higher  returns.    To  address  this  concern,  we  control  for  a  number  of 
observable characteristics that are often considered risk factors, such as the focus and 
maturity of the investments selected by the fund and the fund’s size, age, and location.  
While  our  results  are  robust  to  these  controls,  we  cannot  completely  rule  out  the 
possibility that unobservable differences in risk profiles are affecting our results based on   5 
these  tests.    Therefore,  we  undertake  an  additional  set  of  tests  to  see  if  the  ex-post 
variation in portfolio returns is larger for those classes of LPs that have higher average 
returns.  If  endowments  achieve  their  superior  returns  by  taking  on  more  risky 
investments, we should expect that they have a higher variation in performance across 
their private equity investments. When we compare the standard deviations of returns 
across the different LP classes, we indeed find that endowments are among the LP classes 
with higher variance, though they are not the highest. However, this variance is entirely 
driven  by  the  positive  skewness  of  the  return  distribution  of  endowments.  Once  we 
condition on the lower 75% of the funds across all LPs, we see that endowments in fact 
have the lowest variation across all LP classes.  These results do not support the idea that 
endowments  achieve  their  superior  performance  by  relying  on  riskier  investment 
strategies.   
 
An alternative story is that performance differences across LPs could in part be 
the result of differences in the objectives that LPs pursue when investing in private equity 
(and not necessarily their ability).  For example, Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2004) 
suggest  that  banks  as  limited  partners  might  diverge  from  maximizing  returns  on 
investments  in  order  to  maximize  future  banking  income  from  the  portfolio  firms  in 
which they invested.  We find, however, that banks under perform the other LPs not only 
in the buyout industry (where considerations about future business might be important), 
but even in VC deals where the benefits from selling future services seem much smaller. 
   6 
We also explore the possibility that the superior performance of endowments or 
public pension funds results from historical accident: i.e., that these LPs through their 
early experience as limited partners may have greater access to established private equity 
groups (also known as general partners (GPs)) that manage high performing funds.  To 
test  this  hypothesis,  we  examine  investments  in  young  private  equity  groups  (those 
established after 1990) across all classes of LPs.  If the performance difference is mainly 
driven by the superior access that older LPs have in established private equity groups, 
conditioning on younger GPs should erase the difference in performance between the 
different classes of LPs.  When we repeat our analysis conditioning on young GPs, we 
still find a performance premium for endowments and public pension funds, though the 
difference is much smaller than in the analysis using all GPs.  While this finding does not 
support the idea that the superior performance of these LPs is merely driven by historical 
accident, we cannot rule out that some of the performance difference is due to their early 
access to superior funds. 
 
Next, we examine the LP-specific differences in the selection of intermediaries.  
For  that  purpose  we  undertake  an  analysis  of  LP  specific  fixed  effects.    We  find 
significant differences in investment styles across LPs in the sample.  Moreover, these 
investment styles are significantly correlated with the performance differences among 
LPs.  LPs that have higher IRR fixed effects also tend to concentrate their investments in 
the funds of older GPs and have a smaller fraction of GPs in the same geographic area as 
the LP. 
   7 
These results support the idea that intermediary style seems to be important, as 
has often been highlighted by practitioners.  One of the clearest examples is the Yale 
endowment.  The fundamental characteristics of their investments vary dramatically: in 
hedge  funds,  for  instance,  they  prefer  value-oriented  funds  while  they  heavily  back 
technology-focused venture funds in private equity.  But they have a consistent style in 
selecting intermediaries, whatever the investment style they employ: they favor long-term 
relationships with seasoned groups based in the United States which have well-aligned 
incentives (Lerner, Hardymon, and Leamon (2004)). 
 
Finally, in the last part of the paper, we perform a simple cross-sectional analysis 
of the performance of university endowments. We find strong correlations between the 
LP  specific  fixed  effects  from  IRR  regressions  and  academic  ranking  measures.  In 
particular,  proxies  for  selectivity  from  applicant  pools  and  for  alumni  loyalty  exhibit 
strong correlations with the performance of university endowments, suggesting that the 
top-performing schools benefit from their close ties to accomplished alumni. 
 
This paper is related to the literature on the establishment of private equity funds.  
Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998) explore how tax and other public policies 
affect venture capital (VC) fundraising.  Gompers and Lerner (1996) and Lerner and 
Schoar (2004) examine the contracts entered into between investors and funds, and how 
they  are  affected  by  the  nature  of  the  targeted  investments  and  the  limited  partners.  
Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2003) examine the sources of VC financing across countries, 
and how these are correlated with investment choices.  Kaplan and Schoar (2004) study   8 
how the level of returns affects the ability of private equity groups to raise follow-on 
funds.  But the drivers and consequences of the decisions by individual LPs to invest in 
private equity funds have been hitherto unexplored, largely because the data has been 
unavailable until very recently. 
 
The  results  shed  light  on  the  large  cycles  in  the  private  equity  market  that  a 
number of papers, including Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2000) and Kaplan and Schoar 
(2004), have documented.  The work of Lerner and Schoar (2004) implies that, optimally, 
LPs would use their inside information to screen out poorly performing general partners 
(GPs).  The fact that many LPs appear not to be using their information optimally distorts 
the resulting equilibrium.  The presence of inefficient LPs allows poorly performing GPs 
to raise new funds and thus makes the governance mechanism of exit by sophisticated 
LPs less effective.   
 
The  organization  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.    Section  2  briefly  describes  the 
selection of private equity funds by institutional investors.  Section 3 summarizes the data 
used  in  the  analysis.    Section  4  presents  the  analysis  of  performance.    Sections  5 
examines reinvestment decisions; Section 6, the performance of young funds.  Section 7 
presents the LP-level analysis.  Section 8 examines how the cross-sectional performance 
among endowments varies with observable characteristics.  The final section concludes 
the paper. 
   9 
2.  Institutions and Private Equity
5 
Institutional investors frequently choose to invest in private businesses through 
funds.  This choice is largely driven by the difficulties of directly investing in private 
firms.  The selection of appropriate direct investments requires intensive relationships 
and excellent due diligence skills, which few institutional investors have.  Similarly, most 
institutional investors do not have the resources to intensively monitor a portfolio of 
private firms.  Efforts to jointly invest in private firms with private equity groups have 
frequently encountered  agency problems.  Moreover, the limited partnership structure 
protects the investors from potential liability issues that could arise if they were to invest 
directly in a firm. 
 
As a result, the bulk of institutional investment in private equity is done through 
funds.    These  funds  are  raised  for  a  specified  period  (typically  a  decade,  though 
extensions may be possible) and are governed by an agreement between the investors (the 
limited partners) and the principals in the fund (the general partners), which specifies the 
nature of the fund’s activities, the division of the proceeds, and so forth.  Private equity 
groups will typically raise a fund every few years, beginning the fundraising process as 
the process of investing the previous fund is being completed. 
 
Institutional investors are reputed to widely differ in their sophistication in their 
approach to private equity investments.  University and foundation endowments are often 
regarded as being on average the most sophisticated investors, while public pension funds 
                                                 
5This section is largely based on the industry notes and cases in Lerner, Hardymon, and 
Leamon (2004).    10 
are considered the least.  Universities and foundations began many of the earliest private 
equity investment programs.  These groups thus frequently have a deeper understanding 
of private equity investments, as well as “grandfather” rights that allow them to continue 
to invest in subsequent funds of private equity groups that are closed to new investors. 
 
By way of contrast, the investment boards at many public pension funds are often 
dominated by political appointees.  These directors frequently have little understanding of 
the private equity industry, and may in some cases be seeking to direct investments in 
ways  that  are  personally  advantageous  to  themselves.    These  problems,  while  not 
unknown, are less severe at other classes of institutions.  Moreover, many public pension 
funds offer compensation levels that are very modest by the standards of the financial 
services industry.  As a result, there frequently is high turnover among their investment 
professionals, and average level of experience is modest.  In some cases, career concerns 
may shape the investment decisions of some pension fund investors.  Some universities 
have been very successful at preventing turnover by offering a variety of financial and 
non-pecuniary benefits to their investment professionals. 
 
Two other classes of investors also deserve discussion.  An increasingly important 
LP  is  the  investment  advisor,  sometimes  known  as  a  “fund-of-funds.”  Consultants 
typically help institutions assess the past performance of previous funds by private equity 
groups, as well as evaluate the groups’ future prospects.  In recent years, as more public 
pension funds and individual investors have begun investing in private equity, funds-of-  11 
funds have become more prominent.  These groups will aggregate capital from a number 
of limited partners, and then invest it in a variety of private equity funds. 
 
Banks have long been important private equity investors.  The motivations for 
their investment activity, however, are frequently more complex than those of other LPs.  
While they also seek to earn high returns, their investment decisions are often shaped by 
indirect considerations as well.  For instance, many banks garner substantial profits from 
lending  to  firms  undergoing  leveraged  buyouts  or  else  from  advising  on  these 
transactions.  As a result, they may invest in a buyout fund that they do not expect to 
yield high returns, if the investment will increase the probability that they will generate 
substantial fee income from the group’s transactions. 
 
3.  The Data 
As noted in the introduction, the primary barrier to research of this question has 
been  data  availability.    The  greater  disclosure  in  recent  years  of  private  equity 
investments has allowed us to overcome this barrier.  This section describes the data 
sources we employ. 
 
Investment decisions. To ascertain which institutional investors had invested in 
which private equity funds, we employ two sources.  The first comes from the investors 
themselves.    Numerous  public  pension  funds  disclose  the  funds  in  which  they  have 
invested.    In  some  cases,  this  information  was  contained  in  annual  reports  that  were 
posted  on  the  Internet;  in  other  cases,  these  were  provided  by  funds  after  a  written   12 
request.  In addition, a number of private investors with whom the authors had personal 
relationships  provided  us  with  confidential  listings  of  the  funds  in  which  they  had 
invested.  We obtained detailed information about these portfolio allocations from 20 
different institutional investors. 
 
The  second  source  was  the  compilation  of  private  equity  investors  by  Asset 
Alternatives.    Since  1992,  Asset  Alternatives  has  sought  to  compile  the  investors  in 
private equity funds though informal contacts with the funds and investors themselves.  
This information is included as part of their Directory of Alternative Investment Sources, 
though the underlying data has not been made hitherto available to researchers.  While 
their database is not comprehensive, it covers a large and diverse fraction of the private 
equity industry.   
 
Fund  characteristics.  We  collected  information  on  the  fund  size,  stage,  the 
previous funds raised, etc., from the Asset Alternatives funds database (included as part 
of their Galante’s Venture Capital and Private Equity Directory, though typically again 
not shared with researchers) and Venture Economics’ online funds database.  These two 
databases  were  merged  and  discrepancies  reconciled.    We  distinguished  between  the 
overall count of the fund and the sequence of this particular family of funds.  In addition, 
we used the data on management fees and carried interest of funds from Gompers and 
Lerner (1999), updated through the review of the records of a number of limited partners 
who gave us access to their files.  In total, our database covers 1,398 separate funds that 
belong to an LP portfolio in our sample.     13 
 
Fund  returns.  Our  primary  source  for  return  data  was  Private  Equity 
Intelligence’s 2004 Private Equity Performance Monitor, which presents return data on 
over 1,700 private equity funds.  This information is compiled by Mark O’Hare, who 
over  the  past  five  years  has  created  a  database  of  returns  from  public  sources  (e.g., 
institutional investors who have posted their returns online), Freedom of Information Act 
requests to public funds, and voluntary disclosures by both general and limited partners.
6 
We supplemented this with the return data that we had previously gathered from public 
sources.  Note that we will only use IRR data in our sample for funds established prior to 
1999 (and we verify the results for a sample of funds raised prior to 2002), since this 
performance  metric  is  unlikely  to  be  very  meaningful  for  younger  funds.    IRRs  are 
reported net of fees and carried interest.  As Gompers and  Lerner (1999) shows, the 
majority of funds have a fee structure with carried interest of 20% and management fees 
of 1.5% to 2.5%. 
 
Institutional investor characteristics. We compiled information on the overall size 
of the assets managed by the limited partner, the length of each institution’s experience 
with private equity investing and location from Venture Economics’ Directory of Private 
Equity Investors and Asset Alternatives’ Directory of Alternative Investment Sources.   
 
4.  Analysis 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
6O’Hare has been highly successful at gathering data not only on the returns of new 
funds, but also many of the most established in the industry.   14 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the 1,398 funds and 417 limited partners 
in our main sample.  Data on characteristics of interest were not always available.  We 
indicate in Table 1 the number of non-missing observations.  Panel A of Table 1 shows 
statistics of the funds, broken down into three  categories:  early-stage venture capital, 
later-stage venture capital, and buyout funds.  Our sample is split relatively evenly across 
these three types of funds.  We have a limited amount of data on carried interest and 
management fees, while we have fund performance data for close to half of the funds in 
our sample.   
 
Fund Characteristics. The average fund in our sample that LPs invested in is 
$406 million, but there is large heterogeneity between funds.  The smallest fund is $4.5 
million dollars, while the largest one is $6.1 billion.  Not surprisingly, buyout funds are 
much larger with an average size of $660 million, while later-stage venture funds average 
$330 million and early-stage VC funds $210 million.  The average fund is a fourth fund 
(the  average  sequence  number  is  3.7),  but  there  is  substantial  variation  ranging  from 
partnerships that are in their first fund to those that have raised 32 funds.  Our sample 
contains funds that were raised between 1991 and 2001, and the average fund in our 
sample was closed in 1997.  We find that venture capital funds tend to be somewhat older 
(average sequence number of later-stage VC funds is 4.2), reflecting the longer history of 
this segment of the private equity market.   
 
Performance.  In  terms  of  performance,  we  find  that  the  average  fund  in  our 
sample  has  an  (unadjusted)  IRR  of  6.7  percent,  but  again  with  a  great  amount  of   15 
dispersion: the worst fund returned negative 94 percent while the best performing fund 
had an IRR of more than 500 percent.  The average performance in this sample might 
seem very low.  But it is important to note that this sample includes all funds up to 2001, 
which  might  include  a  fair  number  of  funds  that  have  not  been  fully  liquidated.  
Therefore we also report the average performance for all funds that were raised prior to 
1999 (and thus had at least 5 years to realize returns).  If we condition on this sample, we 
see that the average IRR across all funds in the sample is 24% (excess returns of 11%).  
This  performance  is  comparable  in  magnitude  (but  a  little  higher)  to  the  average 
performance found in Kaplan and Schoar (2004) or in Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003).  
Over the entire period, we also find that early and later stage venture funds in our sample 
had significantly higher performance than the buyout funds; 14 percent and 8 percent 
versus 0 percent, respectively (on an unadjusted basis).   
 
Geographic  Distribution.  Finally,  we  see  that  the  funds  in  our  sample  are 
concentrated on the East and West Coasts, with 47 percent and 31 percent of the U.S.  
funds in the sample respectively.  Only 23 percent of the funds are based in the South or 
the Midwest.  When differentiating by type of fund, we see that the majority of early-
stage venture capital funds are based in the western United States (56 percent), while 50 
percent of later-stage VC and 62% of buyout funds are based in the northeastern region.  
This is not surprising since the buyout industry tends to be concentrated around New 
York and early-stage venture funds around Silicon Valley.   
   16 
Composition of Limited Partners. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of 
limited  partners  in  our  sample  and  their  characteristics.    Endowments  comprise  the 
largest group, with 100 LPs, followed by public pension funds (74) and corporate pension 
funds (72).  When we differentiate among the different sub-classes of endowments we 
find that the majority of endowments in our sample are private university endowments 
(63), followed by foundations (27) and public university endowments (10).  There are 66 
advisors in the sample, 32 insurance companies, 30 commercial and investment banks, 
and 43 LPs that cannot be classified in any of the above categories.  (Among such LPs 
are  investment  agencies  of  foreign  governments,  corporate  venturing  departments  of 
large  corporations,  and  religious  organizations.)  Advisors  and  public  pension  funds 
constitute the largest amounts of capital committed to the industry overall (averaging 
$3.6 billion and $2.2 billion committed to private equity investments, respectively).   
 
Sample Period. Panel C shows the breakdown of vintage years for the funds in 
our sample.  The number of funds in our sample increases over the 1990s.  This is due to 
two  different  phenomena.    First,  the  coverage  of  the  Galante’s  database  appears  to 
become more comprehensive in the later part of the sample period.  Second, the 1990s 
represent  a  period  of  massive  growth  of  the  private  equity  industry,  in  terms  of  the 
number of funds raised and the number of investors participating in the industry.  To 
alleviate concerns that sample selection issues due to improved coverage of LPs over 
time might drive our result, we replicate our findings for the sample of 20 LPs where we 
have their complete investment history.   
   17 
Availability of fund performance data. Finally, Panel D shows characteristics of 
funds for which we were able to collect performance data, compared to the entire sample.  
IRR data is available for just over 40% of all funds in the sample across the various fund 
categories (early-stage VC, later-stage VC, and buyout funds).  The funds for which we 
have performance data tend to be slightly larger in size, have higher sequence numbers, 
and have more LPs investing in them.   
 
4.2. Performance Differences across LP Classes 
Table 2 provides an overview of the investments made by each type of limited 
partner  in  the  different  fund  categories.    There  is  enormous  heterogeneity  in  the 
performance of funds in which different groups of institutions invest.  The funds that 
endowments invested in have by far the best overall performance.  The average IRR of 
funds that endowments invested in is 20 percent.  This high performance is, however, 
entirely driven by their VC investments.  On average, early- and later-stage VC funds that 
endowments invested in returned an IRR of 35 and 19 percent, respectively.  In contrast, 
the  buyout  investments  of  endowments  only  had  an  IRR  of  less  than  one  percent.  
Overall,  endowments  had  a  very  positive  average,  since  they  invested  in  many  more 
venture capital than buyout funds.   
 
If  we  again  break  down  endowments  into  the  different  types  of  endowments 
(public,  private,  and  foundations)  we  find  that  foundations  and  private  university 
endowments  have  higher  IRRs  than  public  endowments.    This  difference  becomes 
particularly large when we form the weighted average IRRs where each fund is weighted   18 
by its asset size.  Public endowments have a weighted average IRR of 3.2% while private 
university  endowments  and  foundations  have  a  weighted  average  IRR  of  19.1%  and 
23.3%, respectively.  Interestingly, public university endowments perform much worse 
across all different types of private equity classes than the other endowments once we 
weight by size.  This might partly be a reflection of the fact that these endowments are 
much larger and thus forced to place the bulk of their investments in larger and less 
profitable  funds.    Moreover,  all  endowments  perform  relatively  poorly  in  the  buyout 
arena. 
  
This  difference  in  performance  across  different  forms  of  private  equity 
investments  might  suggest  that  endowments  have  specific  human  or  organizational 
capital that allows them to outperform in the VC investments, rather than a model where 
endowments have fewer agency problems.  Since we do not see the same performance 
differential  for  their  buyout  investments,  the  data  suggest  that  endowments  have 
specialized knowledge in the venture industry.  In section 8 we will analyze in more 
detail what can explain this superior performance. 
 
The picture looks quite different for public and corporate pension funds (and to 
some extent, insurance  companies).   On  average, the funds that these  classes of  LPs 
invested in had more moderate IRRs (eight percent and five percent, respectively).  But 
the drivers of positive returns are less skewed for this group.  The average VC fund these 
LPs invested in had an IRR of slightly over 10 percent, while their buyout funds had an 
IRR of two percent.  Finally, we see that the funds picked by advisors and banks on   19 
average had very poor performance (IRRs of negative two and negative three percent, 
respectively).    This  trend  seems  to  hold  across  all  different  types  of  private  equity 
investments.    Interestingly,  bank  and  finance  companies  picked  particularly  poor 
performing funds among the early-stage VC funds (IRR of negative 14 percent).  We 
must be careful not to interpret these findings as the overall performance of the private 
equity  portfolio  of  these  groups,  however,  since  this  calculation  does  not  reflect  the 
actual size of the allocations to each of the different funds.  This exercise represents the 
ability of different groups of LPs to identify (good) funds on average.   
 
  We also estimated the LPs’ investment performance by assigning weights to each 
LP’s  portfolio  constituents  as  follows.    For  investments  where  the  dollar  amount 
committed  to  the  fund  and  the  overall  private  equity  commitments  by  the  LP  are 
available, we weighted the returns from each fund by the amount committed to the fund 
in relation to the LP’s total private equity commitments.  For all remaining funds in an 
LP’s portfolio for which the commitment amount was not known, we simply assumed 
that the LP invested an equal amount in each fund.  The results of this exercise indicate 
that the performance changes little.
7 
 
4. 3. Are these Performance Patterns Robust?  
                                                 
7Panel A also reveals that public and corporate pension funds tend to invest in larger 
funds, whereas endowments and insurance companies invest in smaller funds.  Public 
pension funds also tend to invest in funds with higher sequence numbers.  Interestingly, 
we see that the smaller fund size for endowments is driven by their allocations to small 
buyout funds and the greater share of venture capital funds in their portfolio: the VC 
funds they invest in are larger on average.  We find that insurance companies and banks 
tend to invest in early funds (lower sequence number) across all fund categories.   
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A natural question is whether these univariate results are robust to controlling for 
the time period when the investments were made, or the choice between venture and 
buyout funds.  We address this concern through regression analyses of fund returns. 
 
For these and subsequent analyses, we will analyze investments at the LP-fund 
level (except for Table 4, which is conducted at the fund level): that is, we will use each 
investment by a limited partner in a fund as a separate observation.  We control for the 
fact that we have multiple observations by clustering the standard errors at the fund level.  
We regress the realized IRR of a fund on a set of dummies for the different classes of LPs 
and control variables for year fixed effects, fund category fixed effects, the year the LP' s 
private equity investment program was launched,
8 and the geographical co-location of the 
fund and LP.  Public pension funds are the omitted category from the set of LP dummies.  
We only include funds that were started before 1999 to guarantee that a majority of the 
returns of the funds have already been realized. 
 
In Table 3,  column (1), we find that only  funds in which endowments invest 
outperform  public  pension  funds,  while  other  LPs  on  average  pick  funds  that  under 
perform relative to those groups.  In particular, corporate pension funds and banks invest 
in funds with significantly lower IRRs.  To understand the difference in the performance 
of endowments in more detail we also replicate this regression where  we distinguish 
between private university endowments, public university endowments, and foundations.  
We find (not reported in the table) the superior performance of endowments overall is 
                                                 
8The vintage is expressed relative to that of the median LP in the sample, which began its 
private equity program in 1987.  Thus, a program begun in 1991 would be coded as +4.    21 
predominantly driven by the private universities.  The public universities and foundations 
have positive but not statistically significant coefficients.   
 
In column (2), we include a dummy equal to one if the LP and GP are in the same 
region of the United States and a control for the age of the private equity program of the 
LP.  We also add a number of other LP-specific controls such as the logarithm of the LP 
size (measured as committed capital) and dummies for the region the LP is located in.  
We find that the main results described above are not affected by the inclusion of these 
controls.    The  relationship  between  LP  size  and  performance  is  negative  but  not 
significant.  When we include a squared term for log of size in an unreported regression, 
however, we see that the average performance of the funds they invest in is concave.  The 
direct  effect  of  size  is  positive  while  the  coefficient  on  the  squared  term  is  negative 




The  geographical  proximity  factor  is  negatively  associated  with  fund 
performance, which might suggest that LPs are willing to invest in funds with lower 
performance if they are in the same local area.  In unreported regressions, we also interact 
the dummy for whether LP and GP are in the same region with the dummies for different 
                                                 
9One could imagine that there are severe capacity constraints in the industry, for example, 
in terms of how much an LP can invest in a given fund and at what pace new fund 
managers enter.  Under this model, larger endowments might be forced to experiment 
more and invest into new fund managers to secure the future choice of GPs.  The need for 
this type of investment might further depress the performance of large funds, since we 
know from Kaplan and Schoar (2004) that first-time funds on average under perform the 
industry.   22 
LP classes and we find that the negative effect is entirely driven by the public pension 
funds.  Only these display a large negative coefficient on the interaction term.  We also 
differentiate whether LP and GP are in the same region or in the same state.  We find that 
public pension funds continue to display poor performance when investing in funds that 
are in the same state, while funds in the same broad region of the U.S. but not in the same 
state do not under perform.  When we disaggregate the endowments as above, there is 
also a strong negative effect for public universities.  These findings are consistent with 
the  idea  that  public  pension  funds  and  public  endowments  face  politically  motivated 
pressures or constraints to invest in their local areas despite possibly unfavorable effects 
on performance.   
 
The coefficient on LP vintage is positive but insignificant.  We then interact the 
LP type dummies with the vintage of the LP’s private equity investment program to find 
out whether, within the different classes of LPs, those that started investing in private 
equity earlier display different performance from those that started to invest later.  We 
find negative coefficients on the interaction terms for most LP classes.  In particular, 
among corporate pension funds, those LPs that started investing in private equity earlier 
have significantly higher IRRs.   
 
4. 4. Importance of Market Cycles   
To analyze how sensitive fund returns are to  market cycles, in column (4) of 
Table 3 we replace year fixed effects with a measure of the aggregate annual inflow of 
capital into the industry.  From earlier papers by Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2001) and   23 
Kaplan and Schoar (2004) we know that capital flows and returns in private equity are 
very cyclical.  Therefore, our measure of industry capital flows can be interpreted as a 
proxy for the ability of funds to time the market.  The coefficient on the aggregate inflow 
of capital is negative and highly significant.
10 Parallel to before, we now interact the LP 
dummies  with  the  measure  of  aggregate  capital  inflow.    Column  (5)  shows  that  the 
coefficient on the interaction term between LP type and aggregate inflow of capital is 
negative and highly significant in general, but particularly so for advisors (at the 1% 
level) and for endowments and insurance companies (at the 5% level).  These results 
suggest that advisors have significantly lower returns if they invest during periods of high 
capital inflows into the industry.  This result is consistent with an interpretation where the 
latter LPs tend to display more herding behavior when the market is “hot,” which leads to 
investments in lower return funds.   
 
To test the robustness of this finding we also sort our data into two sub-samples, 
funds  with  vintage  years  from  1991-1994  and  those  from  1995-1998,  and  repeat  the 
regressions described in Table 3 (not reported).  Consistent with the herding story above, 
we  find  that  the  poor  performance  of  corporate  pension  funds  and  banks  are 
predominantly  driven by  their investments in the 1995-1998 period, which is usually 
considered the beginning of the bubble period.  By way of contrast, endowments show a 
positive performance difference in both periods.  In fact, the private endowments show 
                                                 
10This pattern continues to hold when we employ other proxies, such as the inflows into 
venture capital funds only or the level of the NASDAQ.  We employ similar alternative 
controls in subsequent analyses.     24 
no difference in performance across the two periods, but the public endowments have a 
more significant positive performance in the earlier period. 
 
4. 5. Robustness Checks  
We replicate the results in Table 3 using excess IRR as the performance measure.  
Excess IRR is measured as the fund’s own IRR minus the median IRR of all private 
equity  funds  in  that  year  and  category.    These  results  are  reported  in  the  appendix 
Table 3A.  The results are equivalent to the results reported above.  We also repeat our 
analysis for the full sample of LP investments, including those made after 1999.  Again, 
the overall picture is very similar.  We also repeat the analysis using median regressions 
to reduce the importance of extreme values and the results are qualitatively similar.  The 
interaction terms between the different  LP  classes and industry capital  flows become 
statistically  more  significant,  while  the  interaction  terms  with  LP  age  become  less 
significant.  The other results are unchanged. 
 
Lastly, in Table 3, we  used the individual investment decisions by  LPs as an 
observation.    We  might  be  concerned  that  this  overstates  the  amount  of  independent 
variation we have in the sample despite the fact that we are clustering at the fund level.  
Therefore,  in  Table  4  we  now  turn  to  an  alternative  empirical  approach  where  we 
collapse the data at the fund level.  We use the number of LPs of each class that invested 
in a given fund in our sample as explanatory variables for fund performance, together 
with fund size and controls for year fixed effects and fund category effects.  We again use 
two measures of  fund performance,  IRR and  excess  IRR.  As in Table 3, we find a   25 
significant positive correlation between the performance of a fund and the number of 
endowments  that  invest  in  it.    For  all  other  classes  of  LPs,  the  coefficient  is  again 
negative,  but  it  is  only  significantly  negative  for  banks  and  corporate  pension funds.  
Overall these results reconfirm our earlier findings in Table 3. 
 
5. Differences in Reinvestment Decisions of LPs 
In the subsequent analyses, we will try to explain what drives these differences in 
the performance of LPs.  One of the most important decisions for LPs is whether they 
reinvest in the next fund of a partnership or not.  Reinvestment decisions of LPs are 
particularly important in the private equity industry, where information about the quality 
of  different  private  equity  groups  is  more  difficult  to  learn  and  is  often  restricted  to 
existing  investors  (see  Lerner  and  Schoar  (2004)  for  a  discussion  of  asymmetric 
information in private equity).  Moreover, LPs have very few governance tools except for 
exit, i.e., not reinvesting in the next fund.   
 
For each fund in our sample, we identify whether the private equity organization 
raised a follow-on fund of the same type.  For each LP investing in the fund, we then 
determine whether the same LP reinvested in the follow-on fund.  In this way, we make 
sure that we do not miscode situations where no follow-on fund was raised as a decision 
not to reinvest.   
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the reinvestment outcomes by class of LP and fund 
type.  Public pension funds and insurance companies reinvest in roughly 60 percent of the   26 
funds where a next fund was raised.  They are followed by endowments and advisors, 
who reinvest in about 50 percent of the cases, while corporate pension funds and banks 
reinvest in only 39 percent of the cases.  Interestingly, endowments and advisors differ in 
their reinvestment rates across different fund categories.  They are both more likely to 
reinvest  in  venture  funds  than  in  buyout  funds.    Most  other  LPs  do  not  show  a 
pronounced difference in reinvestment rate across fund categories.  Moreover, funds in 
which endowments choose to reinvest have much higher average IRR than those of other 
classes of LPs.  Again these higher average IRRs are especially driven by investments in 
venture capital funds.  By way of contrast, the funds banks and advisors reinvested in 
show particularly poor performance. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 explores some of the consequences of reinvestment decisions.  
We find that, across all LP classes, there are significant performance (IRR) differences 
between funds in which LPs did and did not reinvest.  We see that LPs tend to reinvest in 
the next fund of the partnership if the current fund has a high IRR (on average these 
funds have an IRR of 25 percent).  In those instances where LPs decided not to reinvest, 
the current fund on average had a significantly lower  IRR of 17 percent.  The same 
pattern holds when we look at the IRRs of the subsequent fund.  Funds in which LPs 
reinvested  have  significantly  higher  performance  than  those  in  which  they  did  not 
reinvest (seven versus negative two percent respectively). 
 
In Panel C, we now break out the reinvestment decisions differentiated by class of 
LP.  The difference in  the average current fund performance between  reinvested and   27 
discontinued funds we found in Panel B is largely driven by the reinvestment decisions of 
public and corporate pension funds and advisors, who tend to reinvest when the current 
fund  performance  is  higher.    Interestingly,  endowments  do  not  show  a  significant 
difference in the current performance of partnerships in which they decided to reinvest 
versus those they did not (39 versus 37 percent).  This picture reverses when we look at 
the performance of the next fund.  Funds in which endowments decided to reinvest have 
much higher performance than those they decided not to (31 versus 7 percent).  They 
appear to be able to select funds that maintain their high performance and avoid those 
that will have lower performance going forward.  Moreover, they tend to re-invest when 
current  funds  are  smaller  in  size.    Public  pension  funds  show  a  similar  ability  to 
differentiate between good and bad performers, but at, however, a much lower average 
performance level.  Funds they reinvested in on average have six percent returns, while 
those they passed on had negative 2 percent.  Advisors also appear to follow a similar 
approach  of  reinvesting  when  the  current  fund  is  smaller,  but  are  less  successful  at 
picking the better performing next funds.  In short, some investors appear far more able 
to benefit from and/or act on the inside information that being a limited partner provides. 
 
In Table 6, we present the results from a linear probability model of reinvestment.  
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if an LP decided to reinvest in the next 
fund of a given partnership (conditional on a next fund being raised) and zero otherwise.  
In column (1), we find a positive but barely significant relationship between reinvestment 
and  the  past  performance  of  the  prior  fund.    Once  we  control  for  overall  industry 
conditions (measured as aggregate inflows of capital into the industry), LP vintage, and a   28 
dummy for whether LP and GP are in the same area, this relationship becomes slightly 
more significant (see column (2)).  By way of contrast, market cycles have a much more 
significant effect on reinvestments: in times when more capital flows into the private 
equity industry, LPs are also more likely to reinvest.  Moreover, we see that the LPs’ 
vintage has no significant effect on the reinvestment decision, but LPs tend to be more 
likely  to  reinvest  if  the  GP  is  geographically  proximate.    We  add  dummies  for  the 
different  classes  of  LPs  in  Column  (3).    We  see  that  corporate  pension  funds  and 
endowments are less likely to reinvest on average.  This might indicate that these groups 
follow a more proactive investment strategy, in which they exercise their exit right if they 
are not happy with the relationship. 
 
In column (4), we now add interaction terms between the LP class dummies and 
the LP vintage.  This allows us to test whether older LPs in different LP classes are more 
likely to reinvest.  We find that among corporate pension fund and banks, older LPs are 
more likely to reinvest in a GP.  This result could suggest that corporate pension funds 
and banks tend to be less proactive in their investment strategy.  Of course one could also 
conjecture that these older LPs tend to have valuable long-standing relationships with 
their GPs.  Given the lower performance results we documented for these types of LPs in 
Table 3, however, this interpretation seems less plausible.   
 
Finally we also interact LP types with fund IRR or aggregate capital inflow (not 
reported in the table).  By doing so, we hope to test whether different types of LPs are 
more sensitive to the past performance of a fund or the market conditions when deciding   29 
whether to reinvest.  While across most funds the coefficient on this interaction term is 
positive, it is not significant.  We also repeated all the analyses in Table 6 using logit 
specifications with qualitatively the same results (not reported). 
 
6. Are the Patterns Driven by Fund Access? 
One possible explanation is that the superior performance of endowments is an 
accident of history.  As Kaplan and Schoar (2004) document, private equity funds display 
a concave relationship between fund size and performance: the best funds apparently 
limit their size, even if they could raise far more capital.  Typically, these limitations are 
implemented by restricting access to existing limited partners, who are given the right to 
reinvest a set amount, and not accepting new investors.  These facts  may imply that 
endowments enjoy superior returns not because of better fund selection, but because their 
early experience gave them a “seat at the table” among superior groups.  To explore the 
possibility that the results simply reflect superior access, we analyze recent investment 
decisions in young private equity groups.  In these cases, access to the funds is much less 
critical: existing limited partners should have little preferential access.
11  
 
Table  7  summarizes  the  performance  of  different  classes  of  LPs  for  funds 
managed by recently established private equity groups.  We use the median founding year 
(1990)  of  all  private  equity  groups  in  our  sample  as  a  cut-off,  and  explore  whether 
endowments continue to enjoy superior performance when they invest in the younger 
                                                 
11It is possible that existing relationships and prestige of an established limited partner 
help somewhat in getting access to the hottest new funds, but typically new funds are not 
in the position of turning away new investors.  
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private equity groups.  Panel A shows the results if we include all funds started after 
1990.  In this case we find that endowments and public pension funds do not outperform 
the sample anymore.  Moreover, the differences in performance between the different 
LPs are less pronounced.  But advisors and banks seem to perform most poorly when we 
condition on the younger GPs.  One might be concerned that including all funds started 
after 1990 in the sample could create bias, if some classes of LPs such as endowments are 
more likely to invest in recent years when returns have not been realized.  We therefore 
repeat the analysis restricting the sample to young funds that closed before 1999 (Panel 
B).  The picture changes significantly if we use this cut-off, since now endowments and 
public pension funds tend to outperform the rest of the LPs, while banks and other LPs do 




Overall, these results suggest that some of the differences in the performance of 
LPs  (in  particular,  endowments  and  public  pension  funds)  might  be  attributable  to 
preferential access of these LPs that have been in the industry for a long time.  Over time, 
they may have developed good relationships with established and successful funds in the 
industry.    But  endowments  still  outperform  other  LPs  to  some  extent,  even  when 
choosing among the younger GPs.  Moreover, it might be optimal for established LPs to 
invest in a number of younger funds even if the expected returns on these funds are low 
                                                 
12We also repeat a regression approach along similar lines as Table 3, including only 
funds established after 1990 and before 1999.  Parallel to the descriptive statistics we find 
young funds in which banks invest do significantly worse.  All LP dummies except for 
endowments have a negative coefficient relative to the omitted category (public pension 
funds) but none of these are significant.  When we use excess IRR as the dependent 
variable, endowments have significantly positive performance.   
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initially.  The goal of this strategy could be the need to generate information about new 
classes  of  funds  (e.g.,  Chinese  venture  capital)  and  to  create  a  pipeline  of  a  new 
generation of GPs with whom they will have preferential relationships going forward.  
This in turn could bias our results on the returns of young funds downwards and make the 
differences between LP classes less pronounced than they might otherwise be. 
 
7. LP-Specific Differences 
Our analysis so far has focused on the differences between LP classes.  But not all 
endowment or pension fund investors are equal.  Therefore, we now turn to analyzing the 
importance of the underlying heterogeneity  among individual  LPs.  The analysis that 
follows  will  allow  us  to  investigate  whether  differences  in  investment  styles  are 
systematically related to differences in the performance of LPs.   
 
For  that  purpose,  we  estimate  a  model  with  LP-specific  fixed  effects.    We 
augment the standard model we used in Table 3 by adding a full set of LP-specific fixed 
effects instead of dummies for LP classes.  This allows us to test whether individual LPs 
differ in their intermediary investment styles, e.g., their propensity to invest in younger, 
larger, or better performing funds.  Table 8 reports the results from this exercise for a 
number of different dependent variables.  The first row of this table reports the R
2 of a 
regression of the raw fund IRR on controls for fund category and vintage  year fixed 
effects.  The R
2 in this regression is 28.9%.  We now add the dummies for LP classes to 
this specification.  Row 2 shows that the R
2 goes up to 29.7%.  Moreover, the F-test for 
the joint significance of the LP class dummies is significant at the 1% level.  When we   32 
include the full set of individual LP fixed effects, the R
2 of the regression increases to 
35.2%.  This increase is much more pronounced relative to the base model than when we 
included  the  LP  class  dummies  in  row  2.    This  finding  suggests  that  LP-specific 
heterogeneity explains a bigger fraction of the overall variation of LP performance than 
differences between LP classes.  We also find that an F-test on the joint significance of 
the LP fixed effects is significant at the 1% level. 
 
We  also  repeat  this  analysis  using  excess  IRR  as  the  dependent  variable.  
Similarly to before, we find that R
2 between the base model and the model with LP type 
dummies increases from 11.7% to 12.7%, but when we include the individual LP fixed 
effects  the  R
2  goes  up  to  19.2%.    The  same  patterns  hold  for  the  other  dependent 
variables: GP founding year, GP size, and the change in size between two consecutive 
funds.  In each case, the increase in R
2 is much larger when including the individual LP 
fixed effects.  Overall, these findings suggest that LP-specific differences in investment 
styles are more important than differences between LP types in explaining the variation 
in LP performance. 
 
7. 1. Differences within LP Classes 
A natural question is whether some classes of LPs are more heterogeneous than 
others.  To look at the heterogeneity in LP styles by class of LP, we collect the estimated 
LP fixed effects and calculate the mean, median, and standard deviations of these fixed 
effects by LP type.  If the distribution of the estimated fixed effects is very tight around 
the sample mean, it would suggest that LPs do not vary greatly within LP classes, and   33 
vice  versa  if  the  distribution  is  very  wide.    Moreover,  we  can  analyze  if  there  are 
differences in the distribution across different LP class. 
 
The results in Table 9 suggest that the standard deviations of IRR fixed effects for 
endowments are somewhat larger than the other LPs.  Panels A and B show that the 
standard deviation of the raw IRR and excess IRR fixed effects for endowments are 31 
and 23 respectively, higher than for the other LP classes (except the “other” category).  
However, this could be driven by the positive skewness of fund returns for endowments.  
Indeed, when we condition on the lower 75% of funds across all LPs, the difference in 
spreads  across  the  different  LP  classes  is  much  less  apparent  (Panels  C  and  D,  and 
Figure 1).  The standard deviations are relatively similar across the different LP classes 
for the other dimensions of LP investment styles, which suggest that there is no striking 
asymmetry in the amount of heterogeneity across LP classes. 
 
7. 2. Correlation between the Dimensions of LP Investment Styles 
Finally, we analyze how the different dimensions of an  LP’s investment style 
correlate with one another and with performance.  For that purpose, we accumulate the 
estimated LP fixed effects in one matrix, where each row contains all the estimated fixed 
effects from the regressions with different dependent variables for a given LP.  So an LP 
who has high performance across its different funds and invests with smaller GPs on 
average will have a high fixed effect in the performance regression and a lower fixed 
effect in the GP size regression.  We can now correlate these different fixed effects to 
understand how these different investment dimensions are related to one another.   34 
 
Table 10 shows the correlation structure within our sample of LPs.  Each cell in 
this table represents the correlation between one set of fixed effects, described in the top 
row of the table, and another set of fixed effects described on the left hand side of the 
table.  The first cell shows that, not surprisingly, the correlation between the raw IRR 
fixed effects and the excess IRR fixed effects is high (point estimate of 0.62) and strongly 
significant.    When  we  look  at  the  correlation  of  raw  IRR  fixed  effects  and  other 
dimensions of LP investment style, we find that LPs who have higher fixed effects on the 
change in fund size and GP size are correlated with higher performance fixed effects.  
The interpretation of these results is that LPs who invest in larger and faster growing 
funds on average tend to have higher average IRRs.  And finally, we document a negative 
correlation between the IRR fixed effect of an LP and the fixed effects on average GP 
founding year and the fraction of GPs in the same region as the LP.   
 
Looking at the other dimensions of LP investment style, we find that LPs that 
have higher fixed effects on the change in fund size (that is, those investing in funds that 
increase their fund size more from one fund to the next) have lower GP founding year 
fixed effects, a lower fraction of GPs in the same area, higher GP size fixed effects, and 
higher  reinvestment  fixed  effects.    Moreover,  we  find  positive  and  significant 
relationships  between  the  fixed  effect  for  GP  size,  reinvestment  by  the  LP,  and  the 
fraction of GPs in the same region.  And finally we find a positive correlation between   35 
the reinvestment decision and the number of funds per GP, as well as the fraction of GPs 
in the same region.
13 
 
Overall, this supports the hypothesis that  LPs vary in their overall investment 
styles along a number of dimensions.  These include the average size, growth rate, and 
founding year of GPs they invest in, the tendency to reinvest in funds, and the proclivity 
to  invest  in  GPs  that  are  geographically  close  to  the  LP.    Most  interestingly,  these 




In this section, we try to understand in more detail what explains the superior 
performance  of  endowments.    For  that  purpose,  we  perform  a  simple  cross-sectional 
analysis relating the variation in performance among endowments to their observable 
characteristics.    Of  the  73  endowments  in  our  sample,  55  are  universities  for  which 
ranking data was available in the 1995 survey of U.S. colleges and universities conducted 
by  U.S. News  and  World  Report  magazine  (47  private  and  8  public  universities).  
U.S. News compiles data from various sources and aggregates them into one overall score 
for each university. 
                                                 
13We also use a similar approach to take another look at the risk and return question 
alluded to in the introduction.  We compute for each LP a rough measure of the total (not, 
as we would prefer, the systematic) risk of its portfolio: the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of raw and excess IRRs of the funds in its portfolio.  (We use logarithms to 
reduce the impact of the skewness of the distribution.)  We find a positive correlation—
which in some specifications is statistically significant and in others is not—between this 
proxy for risk and the LP-specific fixed effects from the IRR and excess IRR regressions.     36 
 
Table  11  shows  descriptive  statistics  for  the  universities  in  our  sample.    The 
overall score of all rated universities in our sample ranged from 71.6 (the lowest score 
assigned to a rated university by U.S. News) to 100 (the highest).  We also collected data 
on  the  individual  measures  of  academic  quality  used  by  U.S.  News  to  determine  the 
rankings.  Universities in our sample had academic reputation rankings ranging from 1 
(the highest) to 129.  The high school class standing of entering freshmen, measured as 
the share of freshmen in the top 10 percent of their high school classes, ranged from a 
low of 14% to the highest possible 100%.  Acceptance rates among applicants ranged 
from 14% for the highly selective schools to 88%.  Yield rates, or the percentage of those 
accepted who actually enrolled, were between 21% and 75%.  Student to faculty ratios 
varied from 6 to 20.  The strength of a school’s resources was determined by its total 
expenditures  on  instruction,  administration,  student  services  and  academic  support 
divided by total full-time equivalent enrollment, with expenditure per student ranging 
from $8,270 to $63,575.  Freshmen retention rates—representing the average percentage 
of freshmen entering in 1990 to 1993 who returned the following year—ranged from 
71% to 99%.  Graduation rates were based on the average percentage of students in the 
1985 to 1988 freshman classes who graduated within six years, and ranged from 47% to 
97%.  Finally, alumni giving rates were based on the average percentage of living alumni 
who gave to fund drives in the preceding two years, and ranged from 10% to 58%. 
 
  To assess whether these characteristics and ranking factors are associated with 
investment  performance,  we  employed  two  approaches.    First,  we  simply  compare   37 
average performance for the different subsets of endowments.  We find that, overall, 
university  endowments  outperform  other  endowments  by  9%.    Among  the  university 
endowments, we see that private universities have an average  IRR of 22% while the 
public ones only achieve an IRR of 17%.  Finally when we sort universities into the top 
50%  versus  the  bottom  50%  according  to  the  U.S.  News  ranking,  we  find  that 
endowments in the upper half outperform the lower-ranked half by 11%.  We confirm 
that these univariate results hold even when using a regression framework as in Table 3 
where we include controls for fund vintage years and fund categories (not reported).   
 
  We also use an alternative approach similar to the one in section 7.2, where we 
collect the estimated LP fixed effects in regression models that incorporate LP-specific 
fixed effects.  We then correlate these estimated fixed effects with the academic ranking 
variables.  Table 12 shows the correlations obtained for the universities in our sample.  
The first column of figures shows the correlations between LP fixed effects in regressions 
using  raw  IRR  as  dependent  variable  on  LP  dummies,  LP  vintage,  dummies  for  the 
region of the LP and for the co-location of the LP and GP, fund vintage years, and fund 
categories.  The next two columns show the correlations when weighted IRR and excess 
IRR are used as dependent variables in the LP-specific regressions.  We find that there is 
a  strong  positive  correlation  between  LP  fixed  effects  and  overall  ranking  scores 
(particularly  for  the  weighted  IRR  regressions,  which  has  a  correlation  coefficient  of 
0.71, significant at the 1% confidence level).  In other words, endowments that received 
higher scores in the U.S. News rankings tend to perform better.  Acceptance rate and 
alumni  giving  rate  also  show  consistently  significant  correlations  across  all   38 
specifications: the more selective universities and those that have loyal and generous 
alumni tend to perform better in their private equity investments.  These effects are still 
present but slightly weaker when we restrict the analysis to exclude funds closed in 1999 
and after. 
 
Overall,  these  results  suggest  that  private  endowments  and  those  with  higher 
academic rankings are associated with better investment performance in private equity.  
The fact that the proxies for the selectivity of the student body and alumni loyalty are 
particularly  significant  explanatory  variables  suggests  that  the  advantage  of  top-
performing schools may lie in the information generated by close ties to accomplished 
alumni, rather than simply in the wealth of the university. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The  differences  between  institutional  and  individual  investors  have  attracted 
growing attention by financial economists.  The diversity of strategies across the various 
classes of institutional investors, however, has been much less scrutinized.  This paper 
seeks to address this gap, examining the experience of various institutional investors in 
private equity funds. 
 
Using data on investment choices and performance that have not been hitherto 
explored by economists, we document a puzzling pattern: dramatic differences in the 
performance of investments by different institutions.  Endowments have an annual return 
some 14% better than other institutions, while funds selected by investment advisors and   39 
banks perform particularly poorly.  These differences remain present when we employ a 
variety of controls and specifications.  We explore the importance of funds’ reinvestment 
strategies in explaining the differences in LP performance.  We find that endowments and 
corporate  pension  funds  are  much  less  likely  to  reinvest  in  a  given  partnership.  
Moreover, those LPs are better at forecasting the performance of follow-on funds.  Funds 
in  which  endowments  decided  to  reinvest  show  much  higher  performance  than those 
where endowments decided not to reinvest.  This suggest that endowments proactively 
use the information they gain from being an inside investor, while other LPs seem less 
willing or able to use information they obtained as an existing fund investor.   
 
We also explore the possibility that the superior performance of endowments or 
public pension funds results from historical accident: i.e., that these LPs through their 
early  experience  as  limited  partners  may  have  greater  access  to  established,  high-
performing funds.  To test this hypothesis, we examine investments in young private 
equity  funds  (those  raised  after  1990)  across  all  classes  of  LPs.    If  the  performance 
difference is mainly driven by the superior access that older  LPs have in established 
funds, conditioning on younger funds should erase the difference in performance between 
the different classes of LPs.  When we repeat our analysis conditioning on young funds, 
we still find a performance premium for endowments and public pension funds, though 
the difference is much smaller than in the funds formed before 1990.  While this finding 
does not support the idea that the superior performance of these LPs is merely driven by 
historical accident, we cannot rule out that some of the performance difference is due to 
their early access to superior funds.   40 
 
Finally, we examine the LPs’ “intermediary style”: the systematic patterns they 
display when selecting private equity funds.  We show that LP-specific differences in 
investment styles are significantly correlated with the performance differences between 
LPs.  LPs that have higher IRR fixed effects also tend to invest in older funds and have a 
smaller fraction of GPs in the same  geographic area  as the  LP.  In  addition, a cross-
sectional examination of the variation in performance among endowments reveals that 
private endowments and universities with higher quality and more loyal students enjoy 
superior returns from their private equity investments. 
 
This  paper  poses  a  number  of  follow-on  questions  that  would  reward  further 
research: 
·  First, better understanding the sources of the performance puzzle is an important 
challenge.  What specific agency problems, for instance, have led to the poor 
selection of funds by investment advisors and banks?  While we can speculate on 
some of the causes—for instance, the weak incentive compensation offered many 
advisors and the desire on the part of many banks to attract lending and advisory 
business by investing in new funds—clearly more work is needed to understand 
these issues.   
·  Second, we noted in the introduction that the differing experience levels of the 
LPs might exacerbate cycles in the private equity market.  To fully investigate this 
question, it would be necessary to link the records of LP investments that we have   41 
investigated here with the characteristics of the individual companies backed by 
private equity funds.   
·  Finally, it would be interesting to explore the generality of these results.  Are the 
same patterns seen, for instance, in the returns from hedge fund and public equity 
managers?  If so, it may be interesting to explore the broader consequences of the 
changing mixture of institutional investors.   42 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics - Funds 
N Mean Std dev Min Max N Mean Std dev Min Max
Total closing (MM$) 1,398 406 664 4.5 6,100 395 208 242 5.2 1,600
Overall fund sequence number 1,393 3.7 3.6 1 32 393 3.7 2.7 1 14
Closing year 1,398 1997 2.7 1991 2001 395 1998 2.6 1991 2001
Internal rate of return (%) 576 6.7 51.0 -94.2 513 159 13.8 79.3 -66.8 513
Pre-1999 funds only 341 23.9 59.1 -94.2 513 71 60.5 99.6 -66.8 513
Excess IRR
a (%) 564 6.5 43.6 -90.5 493 156 17.2 67.8 -62.5 493
Pre-1999 funds only 332 11.0 54.9 -90.5 493.4 69 40.2 96.1 -62.5 493.4
Carried interest (%) 199 20.7 2.2 20 30 58 21.8 3.3 20 30
Management fee (%) 115 2.1 0.5 1 4 38 2.4 0.5 1 4
Total number of LPs investing in fund 1,397 5.4 5.7 1 46 394 4.9 4.5 1 31
Geographical location of US-based funds:
West 1,117 0.31 0 1 331 0.56 0 1
Northeast 1,117 0.47 0 1 331 0.27 0 1
South 1,117 0.12 0 1 331 0.12 0 1
Midwest 1,117 0.11 0 1 331 0.06 0 1
N Mean Std dev Min Max N Mean Std dev Min Max
Total closing (MM$) 530 328 466 4.5 4,600 473 660 953 10 6,100
Overall fund sequence number 527 4.2 4.2 1 32 473 3.0 3.3 1 29
Closing year 530 1997 2.8 1991 2001 473 1997 2.6 1991 2001
Internal rate of return (%) 224 7.6 42.4 -49.9 268.4 193 -0.4 21.2 -94.2 57.9
Pre-1999 funds only 134 25.6 45.2 -38.8 268.4 136 3.1 21.8 -94.2 57.9
Excess IRR
a (%) 217 5.6 34.5 -78.4 249 191 -1.3 19.0 -90.5 46
Pre-1999 funds only 129 9.0 42.8 -78.4 248.8 134 -2.1 19.8 -90.5 45.5
Carried interest (%) 54 20.5 1.8 20 30 87 20.2 1.2 20 30
Management fee (%) 32 2.1 0.4 1 3 45 1.8 0.3 1 3
Total number of LPs investing in fund 530 5.2 5.4 1 33 473 6.2 6.8 1 46
Geographical location of US-based funds:
West 442 0.27 0 1 344 0.11 0 1
Northeast 442 0.50 0 1 344 0.62 0 1
South 442 0.11 0 1 344 0.12 0 1
Midwest 442 0.12 0 1 344 0.15 0 1
Later-stage VC funds Buyout funds
Overall Early-stage VC funds
 
 
aExcess IRR is internal rate of return minus the median IRR of the portfolio formed for each fund 
category every year.  
Table 1 (continued). Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics – Mean characteristics of limited partners, by class of LP 
N
Year of establishment 






















Public pension funds 74 1987 24,753 2,212 33% 37% 31.3
Corporate pension funds 72 1986 10,728 635 44     31     10.5
Endowments 100 1985 1,565 200 41     24     14.3
Private endowments 63 1985 1,378 178 44     23     15.1
Public endowments 10 1986 2,207 200 41     21     21.4
Foundations 27 1986 1,783 239 37     26     9.9
Advisors 66 1988 4,811 3,654 43     35     25.3
Insurance companies 32 1983 36,631 1,171 31     32     18.6
Banks and finance companies 30 1983 85,435 671 27     57     19.1
Other investors 43 1989 933 108 57     31     5.7
Overall 417 1986 18,036 1,173 39% 33% 18.2  
 
 
Panel C: Fund observations by vintage year and type 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 All years
Early-stage VC funds 8 15 11 24 19 21 45 41 69 102 40 395
Later-stage VC funds 22 20 31 36 49 43 66 69 76 78 40 530
Buyouts funds 8 19 28 41 35 41 72 75 52 68 34 473
Overall 38 54 70 101 103 105 183 185 197 248 114 1,398  
 
 















Total closing (MM$) 584 292 431 1,002 406 208 328 660
(836) (294) (574) (1,168) (664) (242) (466) (953)
Sequence number 4.1 4.7 4.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 4.2 3.0
(3.2) (2.9) (3.4) (3.1) (3.6) (2.7) (4.2) (3.3)
Vintage year 1997 1998 1997 1997 1997 1998 1997 1997
(2.8) (2.8) (2.9) (2.6) (2.7) (2.6) (2.8) (2.6)
Total number of LPs investing in fund 8.0 7.3 7.6 9.0 5.4 4.9 5.2 6.2
(6.5) (5.4) (6.4) (7.3) (5.7) (4.5) (5.4) (6.8)
Fraction  first funds 20% 14% 17% 27% 30% 27% 25% 37%
Fraction second funds 19% 13% 17% 26% 19% 17% 16% 23%
Fraction third funds 15% 12% 16% 16% 15% 13% 16% 15%
Number of observations 576 159 224 193 1,398 395 530 473
% of all funds 41% 40% 42% 41%
Funds with performance data All funds
  
Table 1 (continued). Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample of funds consists of 1,398 distinct funds listed by Asset Alternatives. 
 
Panel A summarizes fund characteristics according to the type of fund (early-stage VC, later-stage 
VC, and buyout funds).  Excess IRR is internal rate of return minus the median IRR of the portfolio 
formed for each fund category every year.  Geographical location by region follows the U.S. Census 
classification  of  states:  West  includes  California;  Northeast  includes  Massachusetts,  New  York, 
Pennsylvania; South includes Texas; Midwest includes Illinois, Ohio. 
 
Panel B summarizes overall investment characteristics of 417 limited partners (LPs) who invested 
in those 1,398 funds, presented according to class of LP (public pension fund, corporate pension 
fund, endowment, etc).  Percentage committed to VC funds includes both early-stage and later-stage 
VC investments.  Percentages committed to VC funds and to buyout funds do not add up to 100% 
because LPs also invest in other types of specialized private equity funds, such as oil, gas and 
energy, real estate, or venture leasing funds, which are not covered by our analyses. 
 
Panel C shows the distribution of the funds by vintage year. 
 
Panel D shows mean characteristics of funds for which performance data was available, relative to 
the entire sample.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
   


























Public pension funds 2,317 984 4.8 7.6 2.6 365 320 4.8 12.1 1.1
Corporate pension funds 759 826 4.6 5.1 3.1 141 228 4.4 9.4 3.1
Endowments 1,433 588 4.7 20.5 16.9 542 309 4.8 34.6 28.9
Private endowments 953 613 4.8 20.8 19.1 379 324 4.8 33.4 30.7
Public endowments 214 701 4.9 16.2 3.2 61 344 5.4 30.6 7.6
Foundations 266 404 4.1 23.9 23.3 102 233 4.1 44.3 43.4
Advisors 1,667 782 4.6 -1.8 -3.0 551 343 4.5 -0.5 -0.6
Insurance companies 594 542 4.0 5.5 2.1 148 238 4.3 2.6 -5.3
Banks and finance companies 573 721 3.5 -3.2 -4.1 89 252 3.4 -13.9 -13.2
Other investors 244 429 3.7 4.8 5.9 98 148 2.9 -6.8 -6.5

























Public pension funds 910 593 5.6 10.8 4.7 1042 1,557 4.0 3.2 1.5
Corporate pension funds 260 376 5.5 10.9 8.1 358 1,389 3.9 0.3 0.3
Endowments 493 465 5.4 19.3 15.3 398 1,118 3.8 0.1 0.5
Private endowments 307 482 5.6 19.2 17.4 267 1,174 3.9 2.1 2.4
Public endowments 91 517 5.5 17.1 4.8 62 1,324 3.5 -5.0 -5.4
Foundations 95 361 4.6 22.2 20.6 69 717 3.4 -2.1 -0.3
Advisors 601 680 5.5 -1.0 -3.8 515 1,370 3.7 -4.3 -4.5
Insurance companies 218 443 4.6 12.3 7.9 228 835 3.2 -0.6 0.7
Banks and finance companies 177 444 3.8 1.0 -0.4 307 1,017 3.3 -2.2 -3.3
Other investors 86 480 5.4 17.8 20.2 60 815 2.6 -2.3 -2.3
Overall 2,745 544 5.3 9.4 5.2 2,908 1,314 3.7 0.4 -0.3
Overall Early-stage VC funds
Later-stage VC funds Buyout funds
 
 
The table shows groupings of 7,587 investments by 417 LPs in 1,398 funds, and mean values of 
selected characteristics of those funds.  Fund size refers to the total dollar value raised from all 
investors in the fund, fund sequence number is by reference to the private equity firm’s funds 
portfolio,  fund  IRR  is  the  internal  rate  of  return  of  the  fund  obtained  from  Private  Equity 
Performance Monitor, and weighted fund IRR is internal rate of return weighted by commitment 
to a fund as a fraction of each LP’s total commitments to private equity funds.   
 Table 3. Fund Performance Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Fund IRR
Dummy for LP class:
(comparison category is public pension funds)
Corporate pension funds -6.59 ** -7.83 ** -10.99 *** -9.93 *** -7.40
(2.83) (3.70) (4.16) (3.75) (6.01)
Endowments 11.58 *** 9.07 ** 9.34 ** 9.81 ** 25.01 ***
(4.37) (4.25) (4.32) (4.39) (8.15)
Advisors 2.92 2.94 3.65 1.85 26.52 **
(2.85) (5.11) (5.72) (5.41) (10.64)
Insurance companies -5.65 -3.44 -3.95 -4.95 7.41
(3.89) (4.33) (4.64) (4.59) (8.59)
Banks -9.05 *** -4.92 -1.09 -5.81 -11.23
(2.96) (4.49) (6.20) (4.49) (9.29)
Other LPs -7.90 -31.33 *** -28.07 *** -27.62 ** -40.77 **
(5.03) (9.98) (7.01) (10.97) (15.63)
LP and GP in same region -7.35 *** -7.13 *** -6.81 *** -6.31 ***
(2.38) (2.38) (2.33) (2.30)
LP vintage 0.35 0.85 ** 0.30 0.71
(0.22) (0.43) (0.24) (0.43)
LP size (log of total commitments to private equity) -0.80 -0.42 -0.84 -0.39
(0.70) (0.73) (0.78) (0.79)
Total private equity fund inflow -31.55 *** -23.05 ***
(6.69) (6.43)
Interaction effects:
Corporate pension funds * LP vintage -1.60 ** -0.99
(0.72) (0.65)
Endowments * LP vintage -0.71 -0.46
(0.61) (0.61)
Advisors * LP vintage -0.23 -0.07
(0.83) (0.83)
Insurance companies * LP vintage -0.68 -0.86
(0.82) (0.86)
Banks * LP vintage 0.84 -0.69
(1.55) (1.29)
Other LPs * LP vintage -1.27 -2.26
(1.39) (1.53)
Corporate pension funds * inflow -8.05
(10.60)
Endowments * inflow -30.50 **
(12.45)
Advisors * inflow -48.23 ***
(15.57)
Insurance companies * inflow -28.28 **
(13.93)
Banks * inflow 9.63
(13.16)
Other LPs * inflow 38.49
(24.64)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Fund category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LP region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 26.9% 23.5% 23.8% 20.9% 22.0%
Number of observations 2,755 1,582 1,582 1,531 1,531
(1) (2) (4) (5) (3)
  
Table 3 (continued). Fund Performance Regressions 
 
The sample consists of investments by 417 LPs in 1,398 funds as compiled by Asset Alternatives, and 
excludes funds closed in 1999 and after.  Several versions of the following pooled regression are run 




FundIRR DummyLP DummyLP FundInflow
DummyLP LPvintage D_sameregion controls
ij j j j j i
j j




= + + ´





FundIRRij is the internal rate of return of fund i in %.  Six dummy variables identify the class of LP for 
each LP-fund pair, with DummyLPk = 1 for each observation consisting of an investment in fund i by 
LP j belonging to LP class k and = 0 otherwise.  “Public pension funds” is the ‘base LP class’, with 
zero values for all LP dummy variables.  FundInflowi is the year-on-year change in the amount of 
funds inflow into venture capital in the country and in the year of closing of fund i, and is a proxy for 
market conditions.  LPvintagej is the year of establishment of the private equity program at LP j 
relative to that of the median LP in the sample, which began its private equity program in 1987.  
D_sameregionij is a dummy variable and = 1 if both LP j and private equity firm managing fund i are 
headquartered  in  the  same  region  in  the  U.S.  (Midwest  (includes  Illinois  and  Ohio),  Northeast 
(includes Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania), South (includes Texas), and West (includes 
California)), and = 0 otherwise.  Robust standard errors allowing for data clustering by funds in all the 
regressions are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimate.  Intercepts are not reported. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 4. Fund Performance Regressions  
(using individual funds as observations) 
 
Dependent variable:
Number of public pension funds investing in fund 0.32 -0.10 -0.25 -0.90 -0.86 -1.24
(1.31) (1.28) (1.26) (1.24) (1.21) (1.23)
Number of corporate pension funds -5.51 * -5.68 ** -5.61 ** -3.37 -3.35 -4.40
(2.85) (2.76) (2.82) (2.84) (2.73) (2.81)
Number of endowments 3.88 *** 4.02 *** 4.15 *** 5.36 *** 5.40 *** 5.10 ***
(1.28) (1.24) (1.26) (1.22) (1.18) (1.19)
Number of advisors 1.00 2.10 1.00 2.05 2.32 3.22 *
(2.13) (2.10) (1.98) (1.90) (1.84) (1.93)
Number of insurance companies -4.13 -2.51 -1.79 -3.53 -2.20 -1.97
(3.69) (3.60) (3.63) (3.69) (3.57) (3.56)
Number of banks -6.74 * -5.81 -6.87 * -7.60 ** -6.70 * -6.68 *
(3.83) (3.80) (3.81) (3.76) (3.70) (3.69)
Number of other classes of investors -5.14 -8.90 -8.85 -9.05 -12.70 * -11.92
(7.45) (7.28) (7.36) (7.60) (7.42) (7.41)
Log(size of fund) 4.51 7.68 * 8.19 * -0.04 3.04 4.85
(4.12) (4.28) (4.29) (3.39) (3.61) (3.78)
Average vintage of LPs that invest in fund 1.47 1.26 1.03 0.99
(0.90) (0.90) (0.88) (0.88)
Average total private equity commitments of LPs that invest in fund -0.21 ** -0.19 * -0.19 * -0.19 *
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Total inflows into private equity -32.79 *** -16.78
(10.73) (10.72)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Fund category effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Adjusted R-squared 20.0% 21.2% 18.5% 6.6% 7.9% 8.3%




Fund IRR Fund IRR
(2) (3)





The sample consists of 324 funds that were closed prior to 1999 and for which data is available to run 
the following ordinary least squares regressions: 
 
0 1 2 FundPerformance NumLP log(FundSize ) controls i k ik i
k
b b b = + + + ￿  
 
Fund performance is measured in two ways: (1) internal rates of return for individual funds, obtained 
from Private Equity Performance Monitor, (2) excess IRR, calculated by subtracting from each fund’s 
IRR the median IRR of the portfolio formed that year and in that category.  NumLPik is the number of 
LPs of class k that invested in fund i.  FundSizei is the total closing amount for fund i in MM$. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 5. Reinvestment Decisions by LPs 
 








Change in size, 












Change in size, 





Public pension funds 976 0.61 1,330 100 2.5 202 0.54 378 106.4 7.6
Corporate pension funds 346 0.38 1,181 96 0.6 88 0.36 344 100.8 11.8
Endowments 777 0.48 808 95 18.7 346 0.54 405 102.5 35.8
Advisors 671 0.48 1,041 103 -8.7 250 0.51 460 117.5 -7.3
Insurance companies 227 0.58 781 100 -1.3 86 0.66 323 101.4 -6.1
Banks and finance companies 197 0.40 1,053 108 -9.2 25 0.48 362 120.9 -17.7
Other investors 90 0.34 654 144 -5.8 37 0.35 220 188.4 -26.4








Change in size, 












Change in size, 





Public pension funds 315 0.65 765 96.4 4.4 459 0.60 2,137 100.2 -1.2
Corporate pension funds 93 0.39 649 113.9 0.0 165 0.39 1,927 84.0 -4.5
Endowments 264 0.48 613 82.1 11.9 167 0.35 1,953 101.4 -2.5
Advisors 258 0.54 924 106.7 -12.8 163 0.34 2,117 75.0 -3.2
Insurance companies 75 0.61 663 91.9 2.6 66 0.42 1,512 106.0 -0.3
Banks and finance companies 60 0.40 588 96.5 -15.0 112 0.38 1,457 111.1 -4.6
Other investors 33 0.48 520 125.9 8.3 20 0.10 1,676 92.4 -3.9
Overall 1,098 0.54 732 97.5 0.7 1,152 0.46 1,968 95.8 -2.4
Buyout funds












Current fund IRR (%) Mean 24.8 16.9 0.002 ***
Median 11.2 3.4 <0.001 ***
Current fund excess IRR (%) Mean 16.0 12.1 0.088 *
Median 3.5 1.6 <0.001 ***
Next fund IRR (%) Mean 6.9 -2.2 <0.001 ***
Median -7.0 -12.2 0.001 ***
Next fund excess IRR (%) Mean 13.6 7.7 0.003 ***
Median 1.6 -0.3 0.001 ***
Size of current fund (MM$) Mean 565 676 <0.001 ***
Median 275 311 0.007 ***
Percent change, current to next fund size Mean +106% +95% 0.005 ***
Median +90% +84% <0.001 ***
  
Table 5 (continued). Reinvestment Decisions by LPs 
 














in size, current 
to next fund
(%) (%) (%) (%) (MM$) (%)
Public pension funds Reinvested +22.9% +13.1% +5.6% +10.7% 764 +112%
Did not reinvest +15.8% +7.4% -2.4% +5.5% 812 +82%
t-test 0.076 * 0.105 0.021 ** 0.065 * 0.444 <0.001 ***
Corporate pension funds Reinvested 17.3 8.3 -0.6 5.4 681 105
Did not reinvest 9.1 0.7 1.4 6.8 796 91
t-test 0.117 0.071 * 0.692 0.734 0.281 0.153
Endowments Reinvested 39.3 25.8 30.5 31.4 336 94
Did not reinvest 36.6 30.6 7.1 16.7 528 96
t-test 0.709 0.438 0.001 *** 0.017 ** <0.001 *** 0.736
Advisors Reinvested 20.6 17.6 -7.8 7.1 527 111
Did not reinvest 6.0 9.8 -9.7 5.3 743 96
t-test 0.013 ** 0.110 0.675 0.644 <0.001 *** 0.150
Insurance companies Reinvested 21.7 13.3 1.7 10.4 366 104
Did not reinvest 14.1 6.1 -6.8 3.3 444 93
t-test 0.437 0.386 0.288 0.261 0.299 0.269
Banks and finance companies Reinvested 4.2 0.4 -6.9 0.1 568 112
Did not reinvest 2.3 -1.6 -10.6 -0.6 639 105
t-test 0.698 0.644 0.294 0.817 0.564 0.644
Other investors Reinvested 39.3 24.7 6.8 16.1 239 94
Did not reinvest 2.2 -0.4 -14.7 1.1 414 171
t-test 0.001 *** 0.046 ** 0.044 ** 0.076 * 0.171 0.189
 
 
The  sample  consists  of  3,284  reinvestment  opportunities  identified  by  reference  to  the  sequence 
number of funds within the same fund family.  Each reinvestment opportunity is coded 1 if the LP 
reinvested and 0 if investment in the follow-on fund was “discontinued.” 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Table 6. Reinvestment Regressions 
 
Linear probability models – Dependent variable: Reinvested (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
IRR of previous fund in same family 0.0004 * 0.0005 * 0.0004 * 0.0004 *
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Total market inflow in reinvestment decision year 0.074 ** 0.082 *** 0.079 **
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
LP vintage 0.021 0.025 -0.008
(0.030) (0.030) (0.010)
LP and GP in same region 0.005 ** 0.004 * 0.023
(0.002) (0.002) (0.030)
Dummy for LP class (comparison category is public pension funds):
Corporate pension funds -0.216 *** -0.174 **
(0.063) (0.068)








Other LPs -0.404 *** -0.442 ***
(0.115) (0.085)
Interaction effects:
Corporate pension funds * LP vintage 0.025 **
(0.011)
Endowments * LP vintage 0.008
(0.011)
Advisors * LP vintage 0.012
(0.010)
Insurance companies * LP vintage 0.010
(0.017)
Banks * LP vintage 0.021 *
(0.011)
Other LPs * LP vintage 0.031 **
(0.016)
Fund category effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 1.3% 2.4% 5.2% 6.2%
Number of observations 2,198 1,860 1,860 1,860
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
  
Table 6 (continued). Reinvestment Regressions 
 
The  sample  consists  of  2,198  reinvestment  opportunities  identified  by  reference  to  the  sequence 
number of funds within the same fund family, for which data was available to run the following 





Pr(Reinvested ) DummyLP DummyLP CurrentIRR
DummyLP FundInflow DummyLP LPvintage
D_sameregion controls
ij k k k k i
k k






= + + ´
+ ´ + ´
+ +
￿ ￿
￿ ￿  
 
Reinvestedij is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if LP j reinvested in the next fund in the same 
family as fund i.  Six dummy variables identify the class of LP for each LP-fund pair, with DummyLPk 
= 1 for each observation consisting of an investment in fund i by LP j belonging to LP class k and = 0 
otherwise.  “Public pension funds” is the ‘base LP class,’ with zero values for all LP dummy variables.  
CurrentIRRi is the internal rate of return of fund i in %.  FundInflowi is the year-on-year change in the 
amount of funds inflow into either total private equity or venture capital in the country and in the year 
of closing of fund i, and is a proxy for market conditions.  LPvintagej is the year of establishment of 
the private equity program at LP j relative to that of the median LP in the sample, which began its 
private equity program in 1987.  D_sameregionij is a dummy variable and = 1 if both LP j and private 
equity firm managing fund i are headquartered in the same region in the U.S. (Midwest (includes 
Illinois and Ohio), Northeast (includes Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania), South (includes 
Texas),  and  West  (includes  California)),  and  =  0  otherwise.    Robust  standard  errors  allowing  for 
clustering by LP in all the regressions are in brackets.   
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Table 7. Recent Investments in Young Private Equity Groups 
 





























Public pension funds 506 -1.9 -3.7 65 -11.3 -14.1 183 1.9 -1.0 258 -2.3 -3.0
Corporate pension funds 139 -1.6 -2.9 20 -6.1 -17.3 41 10.3 11.0 78 -6.8 -6.5
Endowments 267 -3.5 -4.2 81 -21.9 -22.1 91 12.0 10.1 95 -2.7 -2.7
Advisors 417 -11.1 -11.7 122 -22.6 -22.0 163 -5.2 -8.8 132 -7.6 -5.7
Insurance companies 103 -5.7 -5.7 23 -19.5 -17.8 37 3.9 3.0 43 -6.6 -6.8
Banks and finance companies 121 -7.7 -7.3 18 -22.4 -18.3 39 -4.5 -4.0 64 -5.6 -6.2
Other investors 33 -6.1 -6.1 11 -8.4 -8.4 11 -3.0 -3.0 11 -7.0 -7.0
Overall 1,586 -5.4 -6.3 340 -18.6 -19.3 565 1.7 -0.6 681 -4.6 -4.5

































Public pension funds 281 8.2 4.4 18 22.5 5.5 83 23.6 16.4 180 -0.3 -1.3
Corporate pension funds 98 6.8 6.7 7 28.2 27.6 27 27.2 26.5 64 -4.2 -3.9
Endowments 134 14.6 13.1 14 2.6 -1.2 50 38.6 34.5 70 -0.1 0.6
Advisors 145 7.3 5.2 10 20.3 19.3 59 20.4 13.8 76 -4.6 -3.4
Insurance companies 58 4.0 2.7 6 3.9 6.4 18 21.3 18.0 34 -5.2 -6.1
Banks and finance companies 72 -0.2 -0.4 3 7.1 7.1 21 5.5 5.3 48 -3.1 -3.3
Other investors 17 -1.3 -1.3 1 -3.8 -3.8 7 6.8 6.8 9 -7.4 -7.3
Overall 805 7.7 5.6 59 15.0 8.9 265 24.0 19.3 481 -2.2 -2.4
Overall Early-stage VC funds Later-stage VC funds Buyout funds
 
 
Panel A shows groupings of 1,586 investments for which fund performance data was available by 366 
LPs  in  686  funds  managed  by  442  “young”  private  equity  groups  (i.e.  established  after  1990)  as 
compiled by Asset Alternatives.  Fund IRR is the internal rate of return of each fund obtained from 
Private Equity Performance Monitor, and weighted fund IRR is fund IRR weighted by proportional 
commitment to the fund in each LP’s private equity portfolio. 
 
Panel B excludes all funds established in 1999 and after. 
 
  
Table 8. LP Class and Individual LP Effects in Regressions of  
Fund Performance and Other Portfolio Characteristics 
 
LP class Individual LPs N
Fund IRR Row 1 4,618 28.9%
Row 2 3.64 (.002, 6) *** 4,618 29.7%
Row 3 274 (<.001, 297) *** 4,618 35.2%
Excess IRR Row 1 4,514 11.7%
Row 2 3.28 (.004, 6) *** 4,514 12.7%
Row 3 482 (<.001, 295) *** 4,514 19.2%
GP founding year Row 1 7,080 3.1%
Row 2 5.96 (<.001, 6) *** 7,080 4.0%
Row 3 453 (<.001, 361) *** 7,080 15.8%
GP size Row 1 7,115 13.8%
Row 2 28.11 (<.001, 6) *** 7,115 17.5%
Row 3 1,686 (<.001, 361) *** 7,115 32.9%
Row 1 3,284 1.9%
Row 2 1.05 (.392, 6) 3,284 2.6%
Row 3 1,633 (<.001, 265) *** 3,284 25.4%
F-tests on fixed effects for:
Percentage change in fund size 






The sample consists of investments by 417 LPs in 1,398 funds as compiled by Asset Alternatives.  
Reported in the table are the results from fixed effects panel regressions, where standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level.  For each dependent variable (as reported in column 1), the fixed effects 
included are: 
 
Row 1: fund category and vintage year fixed effects; 
 
Row 2: fund category, vintage year, and LP class fixed effects; 
 
Row 3: fund category, vintage year, and individual LP fixed effects. 
 
Reported  are  the  F-tests  for  the  joint  significance  of  the  LP  class  fixed  effects  (column  2),  and 
individual LP fixed effects (column 3).  For each F-test, we report the value of the F-statistic, the 
p-value and the number of constraints.  Column 5 reports the number of observations and column 6 the 
adjusted R
2 for each regression. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 9. Dispersion of Estimated Fixed Effects  
from LP Fixed Effects Regressions, by Class of LP 
 
Panel A: Panel B:
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Public pension funds 7.0 12.3 24.1 13.9 11.6 14.8
Corporate pension funds -1.7 3.2 27.2 14.5 13.7 9.5
Endowments 21.4 23.6 31.4 29.9 26.3 22.9
Advisors 10.0 20.0 27.6 18.3 21.3 12.1
Insurance companies 7.9 5.7 22.0 13.8 10.9 13.3
Banks and finance companies -5.7 -0.1 29.4 12.5 12.8 7.7
Other investors 0.7 7.7 38.3 15.3 6.5 23.0
Overall 8.4 12.0 29.1 18.6 16.1 17.7
Panel C: Panel D:
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Public pension funds 0.10 -4.58 14.31 4.63 6.34 10.04
Corporate pension funds -0.53 -3.97 14.93 6.02 6.19 8.17
Endowments -1.58 -5.95 14.10 9.24 8.59 7.89
Advisors -7.77 -8.42 15.33 7.84 9.40 12.34
Insurance companies 0.48 -2.10 14.27 4.59 5.55 7.45
Banks and finance companies -1.90 -5.45 14.38 6.42 5.23 6.23
Other investors -7.75 -8.05 12.97 0.76 -0.23 5.76
Overall -2.00 -5.92 14.54 6.35 6.85 9.18
Panel E: Panel F:
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Public pension funds 0.24 0.29 0.70 2.81 3.34 9.74
Corporate pension funds 0.22 0.30 0.72 1.04 2.10 11.67
Endowments 0.32 0.57 0.74 -2.01 -0.91 11.63
Advisors 0.50 0.74 0.71 0.39 2.81 12.94
Insurance companies 0.46 0.70 0.75 -1.88 -5.49 10.25
Banks and finance companies 0.22 0.56 0.85 -1.53 -3.39 10.09
Other investors 0.80 0.38 1.29 0.87 0.54 11.16
Overall 0.35 0.47 0.79 0.22 0.72 11.21
Change in fund size GP founding year
Fund IRR Excess IRR
Fund IRR, using lower 75% 
of funds across all LPs
Excess IRR, using lower 75% 
of funds across all LPs
  
Table 9 (continued). Dispersion of Estimated Fixed Effects  
from LP Fixed Effects Regressions, by Class of LP 
 
Panel G: Panel H:
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Public pension funds 0.42 0.70 1.39 -0.021 -0.033 0.59
Corporate pension funds 0.56 0.88 1.28 -0.070 0.024 0.64
Endowments 0.62 0.96 1.19 0.054 0.244 0.56
Advisors 0.63 0.98 1.27 0.175 0.254 0.50
Insurance companies -0.19 -0.21 1.08 -0.060 0.050 0.66
Banks and finance companies -0.27 0.16 1.53 0.011 0.144 0.56
Other investors -0.35 -0.30 1.70 -0.071 0.003 0.50
Overall 0.35 0.70 1.36 0.004 0.059 0.58
Panel I: Panel J:
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Public pension funds -0.48 -0.58 0.38 0.51 0.38 0.48
Corporate pension funds -0.40 -0.51 0.44 0.30 0.25 0.27
Endowments -0.38 -0.47 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.45
Advisors -0.53 -0.58 0.37 0.22 0.17 0.21
Insurance companies -0.49 -0.49 0.29 0.39 0.20 0.75
Banks and finance companies -0.19 -0.38 0.53 0.25 0.12 0.35
Other investors -0.38 -0.51 0.55 0.15 0.00 0.31
Overall -0.42 -0.50 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.44
Fraction of GPs 
located in same region
Average number of funds 
managed per GP
GP size (log of 
total capital managed)
Reinvested in next fund 
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
 
 
The table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the LP fixed effects, grouped by 
LP class, from separate regressions of fund IRR, excess IRR, change in size between successive 
funds, GP founding year, GP size, reinvestment decisions, fraction of GPs located in same region 
as the LP, and average number of funds managed per GP in each LP’s portfolio on LP dummies, 
LP vintage, dummies for the region of the LP and for the co-location of the LP and GP, fund 
vintage years, and fund categories. 
  
Table 10. Correlations among Estimated LP Fixed Effects 
 
Excess IRR 0.62 ***
Change in fund size 0.47 *** 0.13 *
GP founding year -0.54 *** -0.37 *** -0.43 ***
GP size 0.16 ** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** -0.27 ***
Reinvested in follow-on fund 0.02 0.19 *** 0.34 *** -0.34 *** 0.62 ***
Average number of funds per GP 0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.04 0.23 ***
















The table shows pairwise correlations of estimated LP fixed effects when each of the listed 
variables is used as dependent variable in a regression on LP dummies, LP vintage, dummies for 
the region of the LP and for the co-location of the LP and GP, fund vintage years, and fund 
categories. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 11. University Characteristics 
 
N Mean Min Median Max
Overall ranking score 42 90.3 71.6 93.9 100
Academic reputation 55 29.6 1 18 129
Freshmen in top 10 % of class 55 62.1 14 63 100
Acceptance rate 55 51.8 14 51 88
Yield 55 38.4 21 38 75
Student to faculty ratio 55 12.3 6 11 20
Education expenditure per student ($' 000) 55 22.7 8.3 18.8 63.6
Freshman retention rate 55 91.5 71 93 99
Graduation rate 55 81.6 47 87 97
Alumni giving rate 55 33.9 10 38 58  
 
The above table shows descriptive statistics for university rankings that were obtained from the 
1995 U.S. News and World Report survey of colleges and universities in the U.S.. 
 
Overall  ranking  score  is  a  weighted  measure  calculated  by  U.S.  News  based  on  several 
individual measures, which included the following: 
 
Academic reputation is an ordinal rank compiled from responses by college presidents, deans 
and admissions directors who participated in U.S. News’ survey.  Freshmen in top 10 % of class 
refers to the share of freshmen in the top 10 percent of their high school classes and is a measure 
of the high school class standing of entering freshmen.  Acceptance rate is the percentage of total 
applicants who received offers of admission.  Yield is the percentage of those accepted who 
actually enrolled.  Student to faculty ratio is the ratio of full-time-equivalent students to full-
time-equivalent faculty.  Education expenditure per student is a measure of the strength of a 
school’s resources and is equal to its total expenditures on instruction, administration, student 
services  and  academic  support  divided  by  total  full-time  equivalent  enrollment.    Freshmen 
retention  rate  represents  the  average  percentage  of  freshmen  entering  in  1990  to  1993  who 
returned the following year.  Graduation rate is the average percentage of students in the 1985 to 
1988  freshman  classes  who  graduated  within  six  years.    Alumni  giving  rate  is  the  average 
percentage of living alumni who gave to fund drives in the preceding two years.  
Table 12. Correlations among Estimated LP Fixed Effects and University Characteristics 
 
Overall ranking score 0.39 * 0.71 *** 0.47 **
Academic reputation (rank) -0.12 -0.07 -0.35 *
Freshmen in top 10 % of class 0.24 0.43 ** 0.50 ***
Acceptance rate -0.33 * -0.60 *** -0.62 ***
Yield 0.04 0.21 0.36 **
Student / faculty ratio -0.37 ** -0.31 * -0.27
Education expenditure per student 0.27 0.38 ** 0.31 *
Freshman retention rate 0.15 0.23 0.37 **
Graduation rate 0.27 0.34 * 0.47 ***
Alumni giving rate 0.40 ** 0.34 * 0.51 ***
Weighted IRR Fund IRR Excess IRR
 
 
The table shows pairwise correlations between each of the variables listed in the first column and 
estimated LP fixed effects when the variables listed at the top of each subsequent column is used 
as dependent variable in a regression on LP dummies, LP vintage, dummies for the region of the 
LP and for the co-location of the LP and GP, fund vintage years, and fund categories. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Figure 1. Box Plot of Excess IRR Fixed Effects by Class of LP, 
Conditioned on Lower 75% of Funds across all LPs 
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The  graph  shows  the  relative  distribution  of  excess  IRR  fixed  effects  when 
conditioned on the lower 75% of funds across all LPs, grouped by LP class, from 
regressions of excess IRR on LP dummies, LP vintage, dummies for the region of 
the LP and for the co-location of the LP and GP.  The line in the middle of the 
shaded box indicates the median, the left and right edges of the box are the 25
th and 
75
th percentiles respectively, and the ends of the line indicate adjacent values of the 
distribution of LP-specific excess IRR fixed effects for each class of LP.  Outside 




Table 3A. Fund Performance Regressions Using Excess IRR as Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent variable: Excess IRR
Dummy for investor type:
(comparison category is public pension funds)
Corporate pension funds -4.77 * -8.62 ** -11.45 *** -10.25 *** -9.63
(2.61) (3.65) (4.22) (3.70) (6.24)
Endowments 21.70 *** 15.72 *** 15.47 *** 16.63 *** 26.69 ***
(6.83) (4.56) (4.49) (4.71) (8.38)
Advisors 7.63 ** 11.35 ** 11.14 ** 11.51 ** 27.90 ***
(3.40) (4.92) (5.52) (4.86) (10.14)
Insurance companies -0.57 2.09 1.10 0.85 12.68
(3.73) (4.37) (4.67) (4.50) (9.24)
Banks -9.11 *** -3.55 -2.08 -4.17 -10.19
(2.88) (3.84) (6.29) (3.83) (7.78)
Other LPs -2.51 -39.36 *** -39.26 *** -37.02 *** -53.89 ***
(5.20) (8.93) (8.22) (9.78) (9.32)
LP vintage 0.26 -8.64 *** 0.34 0.87 *
(0.23) (2.55) (0.24) (0.46)
LP and GP in same region -8.90 *** 0.89 * -8.75 *** -8.34 ***
(2.57) (0.45) (2.57) (2.52)
Total private equity fund inflow -1.10 -13.56 ** -7.28
(0.75) (6.04) (5.67)
LP size (log of total commitments to private equity) -1.42 * -1.13 -0.86
(0.78) (0.78) (0.75)
Interaction effects:
Corporate pension funds * LP vintage -1.55 ** -1.01
(0.72) (0.69)
Endowments * LP vintage -0.98 -0.83
(0.65) (0.66)
Advisors * LP vintage -0.67 -0.57
(0.88) (0.87)
Insurance companies * LP vintage -1.00 -0.70
(0.69) (0.79)
Banks * LP vintage -0.03 -0.62
(1.46) (1.16)
Other LPs * LP vintage -0.60 -1.23 *
(0.76) (0.69)
Corporate pension funds * inflow -4.00
(9.35)
Endowments * inflow -21.66 *
(12.57)
Advisors * inflow -33.75 **
(14.52)
Insurance companies * inflow -27.00 **
(13.65)
Banks * inflow 11.67
(10.37)
Other LPs * inflow 36.91 ***
(8.71)
Year fixed effects No No No No No
Fund category fixed effects No No No No No
LP region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 3.9% 5.2% 5.6% 5.9% 6.8%
Number of observations 2,684 1,541 1,541 1,491 1,491
(1) (3) (2) (4) (5)
  
 
Table 3A (continued). Fund Performance Regressions  
Using Excess IRR as Dependent Variable 
 
The sample consists of investments by 417 LPs in 1,398 funds as compiled by Asset Alternatives, 
and excludes funds closed in 1999 and after.  Several versions of the following pooled regression 




ExcessIRR DummyLP DummyLP FundInflow
DummyLP LPvintage D_sameregion controls
ij j j j j i
j j
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ExcessIRRij is the internal rate of return of fund i in % minus the median IRR of the portfolio 
formed for each fund category every year.  Six dummy variables identify the class of LP for each 
LP-fund pair, with DummyLPk = 1 for each observation consisting of an investment in fund i by 
LP j belonging to LP class k and = 0 otherwise.  “Public pension funds” is the ‘base LP class’, 
with zero values for all LP dummy variables.  FundInflowi is the year-on-year change in the 
amount of funds inflow into venture capital in the country and in the year of closing of fund i, 
and is a proxy for market conditions.  LPvintagej is the year of establishment of the private 
equity program at LP j relative to that of the median LP in the sample, which began its private 
equity program in 1987.  D_sameregionij is a dummy variable and = 1 if both LP j and private 
equity firm managing fund i are headquartered in the same region in the U.S. (Midwest (includes 
Illinois  and  Ohio),  Northeast  (includes  Massachusetts,  New  York  and  Pennsylvania),  South 
(includes Texas), and West (includes California)), and = 0 otherwise.  Robust standard errors 
allowing for data clustering by funds in all the regressions are shown in brackets below the 
coefficient estimate.  Intercepts are not reported. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 